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Introduction
In business cycle models, exogenous shocks to total factor productivity (TFP) are typically viewed as a driving force behind cyclical uctuations. In fact, in real business cycle theory it holds that exogenous TFP shocks are the main driving force behind business cycles. In this paper, we go beyond this interpretation of TFP as an exogenous source of shocks and study the role of TFP as part of the transmission mechanism. In other words, we study the endogenous response of TFP to identied macroecononomic shocks and explore its implications for the business cycle.
We proceed in two steps: First, we empirically characterize the response of TFP to structural shocks using a sign restrictions approach as in Faust (1998) and Uhlig (2005) . And second, we study the implications of endogenously uctuating TFP through simulation exercises based on a modied version of the New Keynesian model of Galí et al. (2012b) .
In our empirical analysis, we document that TFP starts to rise quickly after adverse supply and demand shocks, which result in declining output. Note that this counter-cyclicality of TFP may seem at odds with the well-documented observation that TFP as well as labor productivity are pro-cyclical in the raw data. Starting with Solow (1964) , pro-cyclical labor productivity has been interpreted as an indication for labor hoarding in the sense that prot-maximizing rms may refrain from adjusting employment due to adjustment costs and as a consequence, labor productivity and also TFP, if the latter is dened to capture the intensity with which inputs are employed, are pro-cyclical. 1 In fact, at a descriptive level, TFP is also positively correlated with detrended GDP in our data set. 2 Nevertheless, the endogenous response of TFP to identied shocks is generally in the opposite direction of GDP after some quarters.
While our empirical results do not provide much support for a dominant role of factor hoarding, the evidence is consistent with the view that rms implement productivity enhancing measures in a counter-cyclical way. For instance, Philippon (2006) argues that corporate governance improves counter-cyclically, which plausibly also raises productivity, and Berger (2012) emphasizes that corporate restructuring also occurs counter-cyclically. The idea that improvements in productivity occur counter-cyclically is also closely related to the debate on whether recessions should generally be viewed as periods during which outdated technologies are eliminated and resources are shifted to more productive uses (see e.g. Schumpeter, 1934) . This view is contro-versial and a number of papers emphasize adverse eects of recessions on the allocation of factors. Caballero and Hammour (2005) point out that an improvement of the allocation requires that factors are shifted from less to more productive occupations and although job destruction, which basically makes resources available for better uses, increases during recessions, job creation slows down. 3 However, even if labor is reallocated only with substantial time lags, productivity may increase in the short-run if it is primarily the most productive worker who is retained during recessions (Berger, 2012) . 4 To provide a more structural interpretation of our empirical results, we study the business cycle implications of endogenously improving TFP during downturns in a New Keynesian model.
We model counter-cyclical uctuations in TFP in a simple and tractable way by assuming that corporate restructuring gives rise to counter-cyclical incentives for providing higher eort at the household level. Despite the focus on workers' incentives, we interpret this mechanism primarily as a short-cut to model the impact of counter-cyclical restructuring in a broader sense.
Model simulations show that counter-cyclical uctuations in TFP generally attenuate the drop in output after adverse shocks. However, the decline in employment is amplied since the higher labor eort serves as a substitute for employment during a downturn. These results are, however, contingent on the economy operating outside of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. If the zero lower bound becomes binding, output declines stronger when labor eort increases, since the additional disinationary eect, which originates from the higher TFP, increases the real interest rate and dampens demand. In this sense, our paper is closely related to Eggertsson (2010) , Eggertsson et al. (2014), and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2014) who point out potentially adverse consequences of supply side improvements when the economy is operating at the zero lower bound. In contrast to these two contributions, we focus on endogenously improving TFP, rather than exogenous changes due to e.g. structural reforms.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present the empirical analysis. In Section 3, we describe an augmented New Keynesian model on which our simulation exercises are based, and Section 4 discusses the calibration and presents our simulations. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
3 See Barlevy (2002) , Barlevy (2003) and Ouyang (2009) for alternative views on how recessions may adversely inuence the allocation of resources. Beaudry et al. (2014) argue that although past over-accumulations are corrected during recessions, which should improve the allocation, ineciencies may still emerge due to the increase in uncertainty associated with re-allocations.
4 Jaimovich and Siu (2012) show that routine, middle-skill jobs are lost especially during downturns. See Field (2003) for a discussion of labor hoarding and selective ring during the Great Depression.
2 Data and Estimation
We consider a reduced form VAR model:
where X t is the vector of n endogenous variables, c is a n × 1 vector of intercepts. A j is a n × n matrix comprising the AR-coecients at lag j = 1, ..., p and ε t are the reduced form residuals.
Estimation and inference is performed by Bayesian techniques, which is a natural approach to implement sign restrictions on impulse response functions (see e.g. Granziera et al., 2011; Uhlig, 2005) and allows us to take parameter uncertainty into account. We use a Normal-Wishart prior with 1, 000 draws as in Koop and Korobilis (2010) .
The vector of endogenous variables includes the log of per capita real GDP, RGDP t , log employment, EMPL t , the Federal Funds rate, FFR t , the log price level, PRICES t , the log of real compensation per employed worker, COMP t , 5 and the log level of TFP, TFP t :
We use the TFP series from Fernald (2012) , who generates this series based on a growth accounting exercise. Since hours worked are used for the labor input, this series has the advantage that variations of labor input at the intensive margin are purged from this series. 6 We estimate the VAR on quarterly US data ranging from 1984Q1 to 2007Q4. 7 The starting point of our sample coincides with the start of the Great Moderation period, which is associated with structural breaks in a number of macroeconomic time series (see e.g. Stock and Watson, 2005) . In particular, a bulk of empirical evidence shows that the cyclical properties of (labor) productivity have also changed in the middle of the 1980s (see e.g. Galí and van Rens, 2014; Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2011; Galí et al., 2012a, among others) . We choose 2007Q4 to be the end point of our sample due to the start of the Great Recession. Prior to estimation, we detrend all data series by regressing them on a linear time trend. We set the lag-length to p = 3 lags, which minimizes the nal prediction error. 8
5 Note that we include compensation per employed worker, rather than compensation per hour worked, to be consistent with the model in Section 3. 6 Fernald (2012) also provides a TFP series, which is corrected for the utilization of inputs (Basu et al., 2006) . We use the uncorrected series since changes in TFP, which result as a consequence of e.g. corporate restructuring, may give rise to movements in`pure' TFP as well as in utilization. Hence, by using the overall TFP series, we remain agnostic with respect to how exactly restructuring inuences TFP.
7 See Appendix A for a detailed data description. 8 Qualitatively, our results are rather robust to dierent lag-lengths. 4
Identication of Structural Shocks
We impose sign restrictions on the impulse responses to identify structural shocks (see e.g. Faust, 1998; Canova and de Nicolo, 2002; Peersman, 2005; Uhlig, 2005) . The structural shocks, η t , and the reduced form residuals, ε t , are related through the linear mapping:
where
is one Cholesky factor from our Bayesian estimation exercise, and E denotes the expectation operator. Since Σ η is a diagonal matrix, we obtain mutually orthogonal structural shocks. Identication through sign restrictions consists of nding random matrices Q, such that candidate shocks, η t , produce impulse response functions, φ j,t+k = A(L) −1 B j η t , which satisfy imposed restrictions, where L denotes the lag operator. Drawing from a standard-normal density, N (0, 1), delivers a random matrix Z and applying the QR decomposition to Z generates an ortho-normal matrix Q, such that QQ = I. Thus we obtain a variety of matrices B for each
Bayesian draw and therefore a dierent structural model for each Q.
It is well accepted that output and prices move in the same direction after a demand shock, whereas supply shocks move these two variables in opposite directions (see e.g. Fry and Pagan, 2011) . Although these restrictions suce to disentangle supply and demand shocks, we also restrict the responses of the interest rate and of real compensation to improve the identication (see Table 1 ). Specically, we restrict real compensation to decline after adverse supply and demand shocks and the interest rate to decline in response to a negative demand shock. Following a negative supply shock, we restrict the interest rate to increase. 9 
Notes: We require the sign restrictions to hold simultaneously for all three shocks. The horizon over which we constrain the impulse response functions is equal to k = 4 quarters (see e.g. Peersman and Straub, 2009) .
As shown by Paustian (2007) , identication can be improved further by identifying additional shocks. Thus although we are primarily interested in characterizing the response of TFP to supply and demand shocks, we also identify a labor market shock (see Galí et al., 2012b) . The distinctive feature of this shock is the reaction of real compensation, which we restrict to be positive. For the remaining variables, the imposed restrictions are identical to those imposed for the supply shock. We summarize the restrictions in Table 1 . Overall, the restrictions are consistent with a wide range of DSGE models (see e.g. Erceg et al., 2000; Smets and Wouters, 2003) . The advantage of our identication scheme is that TFP, the variable of main interest, remains unrestricted.
Impulse Responses
Before exploring how TFP responds to the identied shocks, we present the responses of the non-TFP variables in our VAR to see if the identication generates plausible adjustment patterns.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the impulse responses of GDP, prices, Federal Funds rate, employment, and compensation to the supply shock, the demand shock, and the labor market shock, respectively. We report the median responses (solid lines) and the median target solutions (broken lines). 10 The shaded areas depict 16 and 84 percent quantiles.
From Figure 1 , we see that output declines on impact after an adverse supply shock, while prices increase in line with the imposed restrictions. Output reverts back to its pre-shock level rather quickly. The price level response is substantially more persistent. The Federal Funds rate increases initially, but starts to decline after 6 quarters following the shock. Real Compensation also declines and slowly moves back to its pre-shock level. Employment, which we leave unrestricted, slowly starts to decline after the shock and largely mirrors the response of output. Figure 2 shows that output, prices, the Federal Funds rate, and real compensation decline after a demand shock. All variables, with the exception of the price level, which overshoots its pre-shock level, revert back to their pre-shock levels quickly and also rather monotonically. Employment, the unrestricted variable declines, again mirroring the response of output, although the decline in employment is more persistent. Finally, Figure 3 displays the responses to the labor market shock. Output and prices move in opposite directions and the Federal Funds rate initially increases. Compensation also declines, which distinguishes the labor market shock from the supply shock. Employment turns out to decline stronger as compared to a supply shock, while the response is still less pronounced and also less persistent than following a demand shock. gure, we see that although TFP initially declines after an adverse supply shock, the response turns signicantly positive in quarter 5 and improves until around 10 quarters after the shock.
The second subgure shows that TFP also improves after an adverse demand shock. Here, the median response and also the response obtained from the median target model indicate that TFP increases immediately after the adverse demand shock, although being insignicant at the beginning. 11 Finally, turning to the labor market shock, we see that TFP starts to improve endogenously also in response to this shock. Overall, we nd that TFP improves endogenously following each of the adverse, macroeconomic shocks we consider. In other words, TFP behaves counter-cyclically in the sense that it moves in the opposite direction as output. Although this counter-cyclical reaction sets in with a lag of a few quarters after a supply shock, it occurs immediately after demand and labor market shocks. The impulse response analysis also suggests that the positive contemporaneous correlation between output and TFP in the raw data is mainly caused by adverse supply shocks due to the initially negative response of TFP. This nding is not surprising since the restrictions imposed for the identication of the supply shock are also consistent with an exogenous shock to TFP.
3 Endogenously Improving TFP and the Business Cycle
In this section, we present the DSGE model, which we use to provide a more structural interpretation of our empirical ndings. Since the model is mostly standard, we keep the discussion brief. 12 There exists a continuum of intermediate goods producers that operate under monopolistic competition as well as nal good producers that are perfect competitors. Firms in the intermediate goods sector produce by employing capital and labor services from the household.
Prices are set by the intermediate goods sector either by indexation as in Christiano et al. (2005) or in a staggered fashion as in Calvo (1983) . The model features a (large) representative household with a continuum of members that derive utility from consumption and disutility from labor supply. Labor services supplied by members are specialized and workers choose wages in order to maximize the household's utility (see Galí, 2011) .
We augment the model presented in Galí et al. (2012b) to incorporate time varying labor eort, which we interpret as the result of corporate restructuring eorts in a broad sense. In our model, we obtain counter-cyclical behavior of TFP if workers support restructuring measures taken by rms by providing more eort.
While a detailed empirical analysis of the link between workers resistance to restructuring and TFP is beyond the scope of this paper, we present some suggestive evidence in Figure 5 , which plots the change of TFP against either the change of union coverage (left panel) or against the change of union membership (right panel), where the data frequency is annual. 13 We follow Berger (2012) and interpret union coverage and union membership as proxies for the constraints imposed by workers' resistance to restructuring. We see that a decline in either union coverage or union membership coincides with increases in TFP, which is consistent with the interpretation that rms are able to successfully restructure and improve productivity when union power is lower. In the remainder of this section, we present the optimization problems solved by rms and the household and highlight our model modications. In general X t denotes the log-deviation of variable X t from its steady-state valueX.
Producers
The rm sector of the model economy consists of intermediate and nal goods producers. Intermediate goods producer i produces output Y t (i) according to:
is the eectively used capital stock, where u t (i) denotes the utilization rate of capital, andÑ t (i) = E t (i)
is a composite of the (observed) employment stock, N t (i), and the (unobserved) labor eort, E t (i). The parameter ψ determines the scale elasticity of eort, α measures the scale elasticity of capital and Φ reects xed cost in production. The technology shock, A t , follows a stationary AR(1)-process. Thus rms adjust their production levels through variations either in the eectively used capital stock or the eectively used labor input. Using the denitions ofK t (i) andÑ t (i), the production function can be written as:
where we dene TFP in the model as TFP t = exp( A t )u t (i) α E t (i) ψ . Thus TFP t is a weighted composite of exp( A t ), u t (i), and E t (i), which is consistent with the empirical counterpart from our analysis in Section 2.
The cost function of intermediate good rm i is standard:
Cost depend on factor inputs valuated with their economy wide factor prices, the rental rate of capital, R K t , and the nominal wage, W t , respectively, where P t denotes the price of the nal good. Firms in the intermediate goods sector solve the standard cost minimization problem and minimize Equation (6) subject to the production technology from Equation (5). Accordingly, a log-linear approximation of marginal cost reads:
The rst two arguments are the well known (real) factor pricesr K t andŵ t , weighted by factor shares α and (1 − α). The parameter ψ determines the quantitative importance of eort for the cyclical component of marginal cost (see e.g. Galí and van Rens, 2014) . Note that eort operates similar to a productivity shock as increasing eort lowers the marginal cost of production.
The price setting behavior of rms is standard. As in Calvo (1983) each period, a fraction θ P of producers is unable to optimally set prices, but allowed to partially index prices to last period's price ination as in Smets and Wouters (2003) . The rst order condition characterizing the rms' optimal behavior determines the price set by optimizers. 
λ P,t , where 1 + λ P,t is the time-varying gross mark-up. Cost minimization implies that the demand for good i is subject to the following demand schedule:
Given zero prots in equilibrium in the nal good sector, the following relationship between the price of the nal good and the price of intermediate goods holds:
Household
As in Galí (2011) , heterogeneity of household members is twofold. Individual members dier in the type of labor service s they supply as well as in the disutility they face when supplying these specialized services. However, individuals completely share their idiosyncratic income risks à la Merz (1995) and therefore choose the same consumption level, C t , in every period t. The preferences of the (large) household read:
Preferences are separable with respect to the logarithmic consumption level,C t , which is subject to external habit formation,C t = C t − H t , and the fraction of employed type s workers, N t (s).
ϕ ≥ 0 measures the elasticity of workers' labor supply related to real wage uctuations and β ∈ (0; 1) is the discount factor. χ t is a disturbance to the disutility of labor. To reconcile the "joint behavior of the labor force, consumption, and the wage over the business cycle" (see Galí et al., 2012b , p.333), we incorporate an endogenous preference shifter Θ t , dened as
where ν is a scale parameter determining the wealth eect on household's labor supply decision.
As described above, we model endogenously improving TFP through time-varying labor eort exerted by worker of type s, which we denote by E t (s). To do so, the utility function from Equation (8) accounts for the idea that exerting eort reduces the overall level of utility, where κ scales the intensity of this eect. However, we also assume that the disutility associated with a higher eort level varies inversely with the level of output, as captured by the last term, where the strength of this eect is determined by P (E t (s)), where P (E t (s)) = exp(−γE t (s)), and γ is a scaling parameter. This formulation captures the idea that although workers may prefer to exert low eort, they also have to engage in activities to hide their low eort level in order to avoid adverse consequences. 14 The disutility associated with these activities depends on the intensity of monitoring implemented by the management and since corporate restructuring and the quality of corporate governance, which should be closely related to monitoring intensity, are well known to be counter-cyclical, 15 our formulation can be interpreted as a short-cut to capture these issues in a tractable way.
The utility maximizing level of eort supplied by household members balances the marginal benets to exert eort, E t (s), to the marginal cost and is obtained from Equation (8) and equals in a symmetric equilibrium:
or in log-linear terms:
Thus in equilibrium (unobserved) labor eort is high in recessions and low in booms. The parameters κ, γ, and the steady-state level of eort,Ē, scale the quantitative importance of the eort channel. Unobserved eort will have a strong impact on the cycle, when its steady-state level is high (highĒ), the sensitivity parameter, γ, is high, and when the disutility in eort is strongly convex (high κ).
The household budget constraint is standard as in Smets and Wouters (2007) :
I t stands for purchased investment goods. T t are lump-sum taxes (or transfers) and Div t represents prots, obtained from rms. The household holds bonds, B t , issued by the government.
These nancial claims yield the risk-free (net) rate, R t . B t is a risk premium shock. Since risk premium shocks have been attributed to be one of the driving forces behind the Great Recession (see Galí et al., 2012a) , we use this disturbance for later zero lower bound simulations. The household owns the capital stock, K t , and rents it out to the intermediate goods producers. Adjusting the intensive margin of capital, namely capital utilization, is associated with cost, J (.), where J (.) is a convex and increasing function, such that J (1) = 0 andū = 1 (see Christiano et al., 2005, p. 15) .
The evolution of the capital stock, K t , is along the lines of Christiano et al. (2005) and can be expressed as:
Capital depreciates with a rate of δ. Investment, I t , is subject to adjustment cost, S
. The 15 latter depend on the change in investment and satisfy the following functional characteristics S(1) = S (1) = 0 and S (1) > 0. For the investment shock, I t , it holds that I t = ρ I I t−1 + η I t , where η I t ∼ N (0, σ I ).
Labor Market
Wages are set within staggered contracts as in Erceg et al. (2000) . A Calvo (1983) lottery hereby decides, whether the nominal wage of type s worker can be optimally adjusted. The probability for not being able to optimize is θ W . Additionally, partial indexation to past period's average price ination rate in a backward looking Smets and Wouters (2003) fashion, i.e.
, where ι P ∈ [0; 1], takes place. Given a demand schedule for their type of labor service, optimizing workers negotiate the nominal wage, W * t|t−k , so as to maximize the utility of the household as opposed to individual welfare. The notation t|t − k indicates that there has been no optimization of these workers' wages for a time interval of k periods. The respective rst order condition of (wage) optimizers' program is given by:
Due to monopolistic competition in the labor market, wages are set above the marginal rate of substitution, χ t Θ t (C t − H t )N ϕ t|t−k . The time-varying natural mark-up in the ex-price economy is M nat w,t = W t /( W t − 1), where W t denes the elasticity of substitution between dierentiated types of labor (see Galí et al., 2012b ). For the overall wage level, W t , the mark-up is:
on average. Following the footsteps of Galí (1996 Galí ( , 2011 , we are now able to make a precise statement about involuntary unemployment. A necessary condition that a household member will supply his type s labor service is a real wage exceeding or at least equaling his disutility from work (measured in consumption goods):
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This equality in conjunction with L t = 1 0 L t (s)ds denes the labor force, L t . Whenever the economy wide labor force, L t , and the employment rate diverge, unemployment, U t , arises. The latter can easily be approximated by U t = L t /N t . Combining the last expression with Equations (14) and (15), delivers the following result:
Thus non-competitive wage mark-up's, M w,t , can be identied as the driving force behind uctuations of the unemployment rate, U t , in the economy.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Monetary policy is subject to a standard non-negativity restriction for the policy instrument (see Christiano et al., 2011) :
As long as the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is not binding, the central bank follows an empirically motivated instrument rule as in Smets and Wouters (2007) :
whereZ is the steady-state net interest rate. With the simplifying assumptions of a zero growth rate in productivity and zero steady-state ination, i.e.Π = 1, it holds thatZ = (β −1 − 1).
According to Equation (18), the central bank engages in interest rate smoothing, ination and output stabilization, and takes care of changes in the conventional and the natural output level.
ρ, φ Π , φ Y and φ ∆Y determine the relative importance of the respective policy objective. Z t is a monetary policy shock, where Z t = ρ Z Z t−1 + η Z t and η Z t ∼ N (0, σ Z ). Fiscal policy has to satisfy the following sequence of governmental budget constraints:
where G t denotes government spending and B t−1 is accumulated past debt. Spending can be nanced either by lump-sum taxes, T t , or by issuing new bonds, B t .
(1 + R t ) −1 is the price of current debt.
17

Market Clearing
UsingK t = K t (i)di and N t = N t (i)di, we nally obtain the subsequent resource constraint (see Smets and Wouters, 2007) :
4 Calibration and Simulation
Calibration
For the calibration, we draw on the mode estimates reported in Galí et al. (2012b) for the majority of parameters (see Table 2 ). However, we set the discount factor to β = 0.99 and the ination factor toΠ = 1, which imply a steady-state interest rate of approximately 4 percent per annum, as it is standard in the literature on the zero lower bound (see e.g. Christiano et al., 2011) . Galí et al. (2012b, p.340) .
Since the parameters determining the eect of labor eort, ψ, κ, and γ, cannot be readily calibrated, we choose values for these parameters by matching the standard deviation of the quarterly growth rate of our empirical TFP series (σ T F P = 0.58) with its counterpart in the model. 16 To obtain a plausible TFP series from our DSGE model, we need to simulate the model under a rich number of exogenous disturbances. Therefore, we include eight shocks, as in Galí et al. (2012b) , for this analysis, although we conduct the impulse response analysis only with a subset of these shocks. Again, we refer to Galí et al. (2012b) for the calibration of these shocks, except for the productivity shock, A t . We argue that parts of this exogenous innovation could be explained by the introduction of endogenous labor eort. Obviously, implementing a standard Cobb-Douglas technology where labor eort, E t , is not modeled empirically, uctuations in eort will probably be picked up by the exogenous productivity shock, A t . Accordingly, as we explicitly account for labor eort, we also re-calibrate the persistence and standard deviation of the productivity shock, A t , when calibrating our three introduced labor eort parameters. The results of this calibration exercise can be found in Table 3 . The table displays the estimates of our newly introduced parameters as well as the persistence and standard deviation of the productivity shock.
In line with our a priori intuition, we nd a modest decline in the importance of the productivity shock. With the implementation of eort, ρ A declines from 0.98 to 0.92 and σ A reduces from 0.41 to 0.38. Although our matching strategy succeeds to t the standard deviation of the growth rate of TFP perfectly, it is dicult to evaluate the estimated values of ψ, κ, and γ as we do not nd much empirical or theoretical work, which could give us insight about these parameters. 17
Simulation
To study the role of endogenous movements in TFP, we analyze the response of the model to an adverse price mark-up and risk premium shock as examples for supply and demand shocks respectively. 18 16 Galí and van Rens (2014) employ a similar approach. They target the relative volatility of employment and output in their calibration strategy. As our primary focus is on the role of TFP for shock transmission, we focus on the second moment of TFP instead.
17 A notable exception is Galí and van Rens (2014) . 18 Note that the empirically identied supply shock can also represent an exogenous innovation to technology, when interpreted through the lens of a DSGE model (see e.g. Peersman and Straub, 2006, 2009) . Similarly, the Consider rst the price mark-up shock. Figure 6 shows the responses for a standard model (solid lines) and for the model incorporating counter-cyclically improving TFP due to endogenous labor eort (broken lines). We see that while output declines after an adverse price mark-up shock in both variants of the model, the decline is less pronounced when we allow TFP to improve endogenously. Intuitively, the higher productivity allows rms to keep up production. However, since higher TFP also induces rms to reduce labor demand, given the overall demand conditions, employment declines stronger when TFP improves endogenously. In other words, although endogenous improvements in TFP help to maintain a higher level of output the labor market reaction is more pronounced.
identied demand shock can also be an innovation to consumer preferences or government spending (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003; Peersman and Straub, 2006; Galí et al., 2012b) .
Quantitatively, however, endogenously improving TFP has only a minor eect on the response of employment to the supply shock. Turning to the response of ination, we see that the supply shock gives rise to higher ination, when TFP does not increase. We also see that although the endogenous improvement of TFP dampens the increase in ination, the eect is quantitatively small. While monetary policy is tightened in response to the supply shock, the less severe decline in output together with the somewhat less pronounced increase in ination result in a more muted increase in the interest rate when TFP increases endogenously.
Comparing the TFP responses in the models with and without varying labor eort shows that the supply shock leads to lower TFP in the benchmark model in contrast to improvements in the augmented model. The pro-cyclical response in the benchmark model is due to the endogenous reaction of the capital utilization rate (see our denition of TFP in Equation (5)). Finally, the gure shows that real compensation declines after the adverse shocks, with only small dierences across the two scenarios. Figure 7 shows the responses to an adverse shock to the risk premium. Similar to what we nd for the price mark-up shock, the output response is muted and the employment response is amplied, when we allow TFP to improve endogenously. Quantitatively the deviations from the baseline model are of a similar order of magnitude for output and employment here. Due to lower demand, ination declines and the eect is initially more pronounced when TFP increases endogenously, which is again due to the disinationary eect exerted by the higher TFP. Declining output and a lower ination rate result in a lower interest rate, where the response of monetary policy is again more accomodative when TFP improves. While TFP improves endogenously in the model with variable eort, it declines to some extent in the benchmark model. Real compensation also declines with only small quantitative dierences across models.
Overall, we see that endogenously improving TFP generally dampens the impact of adverse shocks on output, whereas it amplies the eect on employment. A crucial element is the reaction of monetary policy. Since the improvement in TFP induces disinationary pressure, the interest rate reaction is generally more accomodative, which also cushions the decline in output by stimulating demand.
These conclusions change strongly when we consider the responses to a risk premium shock that is strong enough to make the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binding in Figure   8 . 19 The gure shows that with endogenously improving TFP, output as well as employment both decline stronger than in the baseline case when the shock is strong enough to make the zero lower bound binding. 20 The reason for these dierences in the outcomes is the constraint imposed by the zero lower bound on monetary policy. While the additional, disinationary eect exerted by the increase in TFP allows the central bank to reduce the interest rate more strongly to support the recovery as long as the the shock is suciently small, the strong decline in ination associated with a large demand shock together with the binding zero lower bound result in a relative high real interest rate. As a result, demand declines even further and the decline in output turns out to be more pronounced. 21 20 We consider a shock period of 8 quarters for the risk premium shocks in both cases, implemented as a deterministic simulation exercise (see Christiano et al., 2011) . 21 Wieland (2014) We now take a closer look at the individual components of TFP and labor productivity in Figures   9 and 10. Recall that in the model, TFP consists of labor eort, E t , and capital utilization, u t . 22 We see from Figure 9 that although magnitudes vary somewhat, eort improves regardless of the type and size of the shock, whereas capital utilization generally declines and the decline is stronger when eort improves endogenously since rms substitute eort for the other input factors, including capital utilization.
Finally, Figure 10 shows that labor productivity generally responds in a pro-cyclical way after each shock. When we allow eort to improve counter-cyclical, however, the decline in labor Keynesian framework, such shocks are expansionary by increasing ination and thereby lowering the real rate of interest at zero nominal interest rates. Wieland (2014) argues that nancial frictions may counteract this eect, which may also dampen the eect when TFP improves endogenously. 22 Ignoring the exogenous productivity shock for now.
productivity is substantially dampened. TFP. We nd, however, that TFP improvements amplify the negative response of employment, which is due to a strong increase in the intensive margin of labor.
We also nd that if the economy is operating at the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, then the output decline becomes more pronounced once we allow for endogenous improvements in TFP arising from enhanced labor eort. The reason for this strong amplication is the additional disinationary eect that originates from the higher TFP.
While we focus on the US economy in our analysis, the role of TFP for the transmission of shocks may dier across countries due to structural dierences, and in particular, due to dierences in labor market institutions. Thus studying potential cross-country dierences in the endogenous response of TFP to shocks appears to be an interesting avenue for future research. 
